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This is a comment on a collection of statements gathered on the occasion of the
Quantum Physics of Nature meeting in Vienna.
In a recent paper [1], twenty-seven authors presented their personal views on Anton
Zeilinger’s philosophy of physics with a view to stimulating a discussion. Here is my
humble contribution toward this worthy objective.
• There is no quantum information. There is only a quantum way of handling infor-
mation. (Attributed to A. Z.)
We have two kinds of information about the quantum world, (i) information of nomological
character—the quantal correlation laws—and (ii) information about matters of fact—the
outcomes of performed measurements. Together they permit us to assign probabilities to
the possible outcomes of (as yet) unperformed measurements. From here on, there is no
need to ever again use the word “information.”
In the good old days of classical physics, all there was, was deterministic correlations
between measurement outcomes. Because they were deterministic, it was OK to imagine
causal links, but the idea that we had any understanding of the nature of the causal links
(beyond the correlations) was a delusion. The transmogrification of mathematical symbols
into physical processes or states of affairs was never more than a sleight of hand. All we
now have is probabilistic correlations between measurement outcomes. With probabilistic
correlations, the transmogrification of mathematical symbols into physical processes or
states of affairs no longer works.1
• Photons are clicks in photon detectors. (Attributed to A. Z.)
Photons are correlations between clicks in counters.
• Descriptions of experiments with photons should not make use of the term vacuum.
(Attributed to A. Z.)
1So it’s harder for a teacher to avoid pesky student questions, albeit not for want of trying. In the
Prologue to their beautiful book The Quantum Challenge, Greenstein and Zajonc [2] observe that “in
every textbook we know, quantum mechanics has been largely sanitized of these beautiful enticements
and their implications.” It makes one wonder. . .
1
That term should be eliminated from the dictionary of quantum physics. Positions are
not different from other properties: if they are not possessed then they do not exist. There
is no empty space because there are no unpossessed positions. Where there is nothing,
there is no there. (More carefully worded: positions only exist as spatial relations, and
these do not exist without material relata.)
• Objective randomness is probably the most important element of quantum physics.
(Attributed to A. Z.)
And understanding objective randomness is certainly the most urgent task for quantum
philosophers. Unfortunately, most of their time is wasted with pseudoproblems. As a
philosopher of science once put it to me, to solve the PLOP2 “means to design an in-
terpretation in which measurement processes are not different in principle from ordinary
physical interactions.” Immanuel Kant admitted to having been woken from his “dog-
matic slumbers” by David Hume. This led Bertrand Russell to quip that Kant quickly
invented a soporific that allowed him (Kant) to go back to sleep. What said philosopher
of science expects from us is another soporific. What we really need to understand is why
the fundamental theoretical framework of physics is an algorithm for assigning probabil-
ities to possible measurement outcomes (on the basis of actual measurement outcomes),
and why measurements do play a special role in our fundamental theory of matter.
• Quantum mechanics applies to single quantum systems. (Attributed to A. Z.)
Quantummechanics applies to correlations between (any number of) measurement devices.
• The border between classical and quantum phenomena is just a question of money.
(Attributed to A. Z.)
A question of brawn rather than a question of brains? I have my doubts.
• The speed of the collapse is bull . . .
Although this item was censored (commented out in the source file) I couldn’t agree more:
with or without speed, collapse is [bleep].
• Objective (absolute) randomness is hardly fully verifiable. . . the a priori exclusion
of any reason whatsoever cannot be falsified/verified. (Markus Arndt)
True, absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence. But we have more
than absence of evidence. Even Bohmians agree that their surreal particle trajectories
are unobservable. The absence of evidence is nomological. Why are Bohmian trajectories
unobservable? The simplest answer is: because they don’t exist!
But the real issue is not objective randomness; it is objective fuzziness.3 In the labo-
ratory, the objective fuzziness of an observable (or its value) evinces itself as a probability
2The piddling laboratory operations problem: “To restrict quantum mechanics to be exclusively about
piddling laboratory operations is to betray the great enterprise.” (John Bell [3])
3“Fuzziness” is the actual meaning of Heisenberg’s original term, Unscha¨rfe. The stability of atoms
rests on the objective fuzziness of their internal relative positions and momenta, not on our “uncertainty”
about the exact values of these observables.
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distribution (with nonzero dispersion) over alternative outcomes in a series of measure-
ments performed on an ensemble of “identically prepared” systems.4
And beyond that, the real issue is to make sense of fuzzy values. To my mind, there
is a straightforward way of doing this [4, 5, 6]: Whenever quantum mechanics instructs
us to add amplitudes rather than probabilities, the distinctions we make between the
corresponding alternatives/possibilities are distinctions that Nature does not make. They
correspond to nothing in the real world. They exist solely in our heads. The reason why
an electron (or buckyball, for that matter) can go simultaneously through two (or many)
slits without being split into parts that go through different slits5 is that the distinctions
we make between the regions defined by the slits (or between the alternative paths)
correspond to nothing in the real world—as far as that electron or buckyball is concerned.
The reality of spatial distinctions is relative: the distinction we make between two regions
or paths may be real for one system at one time and not real for another system at the
same time or for the same system at another time. From this it follows that space must
not be thought of as consisting of (intrinsically distinct) parts.
And beyond that, the real issue is: What are the conditions under which those dis-
tinctions are real (for a given system at a given time)? In other words, when does a
proposition like “the electron went through the left slit” have a truth value? As far as
unadulterated, standard quantum mechanics is concerned—no surreal particle trajecto-
ries a` la Bohm [7], no nonlinear modifications of the Schro¨dinger equation a` la Ghirardi,
Rimini, and Weber [8] or Pearle [9], no extraneous axioms like the eigenstate-eigenvalue
link [10] or the modal semantical rule [11]—the only condition available is to be measured.
No property is a possessed property unless its possession can be inferred from some actual
event or state of affairs—a “measurement.”
The implied supervenience of the microscopic on the macroscopic contradicts one
of our most incorrigible “intuitions,” according to which the properties of macroscopic
objects exist by virtue of the properties of microscopic objects: the macroworld is what
it is because its microscopic constituents are what they are. The ontological implications
of the quantal probability algorithm are incompatible with this bottom-up philosophy.
The statistics of indistinguishable particles does not permit us to build reality out of
a multitude of intrinsically distinct, transtemporally identical material parts, and the
relativity of the reality of spatial distinctions does not permit us to build reality out of
(or on) intrinsically distinct spatial parts. The “foundation” is the macroworld.
Once we get used to not thinking of physical space as consisting of intrinsically distinct
parts or, God help us, points, it is easy to see that we need a macroscopic detector not
only to indicate the presence of something somewhere but also to realize (make real) the
property of being inside the detector’s sensitive region—to make a position available for
attribution.
• I think that no object can be defined without reference to its external world.
(Markus Arndt)
The way I see it, no microscopic object can be defined without reference to the macroworld,
4Strictly speaking, what evinces itself is the fuzzy value that would have obtained if no measurement
had been made.
5We don’t picture parts of a C60 molecule as getting separated by many times the period of the
diffraction grating (100 nm) and then reassemble into a ball less than a nanometer across.
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and no macroscopic object can be defined without reference to the rest of the macroworld.
Macroscopic objects, properly defined [4, 5], localize each other (relative to each other) so
sharply that their relative positions are only counterfactually fuzzy. They are fuzzy only
relative to an imaginary background that is more differentiated spacewise than is the real
world.
• The fascination of quantum physics lies in the fact that it is not yet formulated
coherently by a set of simple foundational principles. (Markus Aspelmeyer)
It probably cannot be so formulated, for the same reason that the quantum world cannot
be built from the bottom up.
• There is no border between classical and quantum phenomena – you just have to
look closer. (Reinhold Bertlmann)
There is no border, but there is a limit. In a world of “more or less fuzzy,” the least fuzzy
is (onto)logically different from the rest.
• We don’t know why events happen. (A. Z. as quoted by Chris Fuchs)
Quantum physics concerns correlations between property-indicating events or states of
affairs. It does not account for the occurrence or existence of the correlata, anymore than
classical physics explains why there is anything, rather than nothing at all. On the other
hand, as ingredients of a theory that presupposes correlata, the quantal correlation laws
are trivially consistent with their occurrence or existence.
• We have to understand therefore what it means to collect information about some-
thing which is not as much structured as we think.
(A. Z. as quoted by Chris Fuchs)
That the world is not as much structured as we think seems to me to be a crucial point.
If we go on dividing a material object, its so-called “constituents” lose their individuality,
and if we conceptually partition the world into sufficiently small but still finite regions,
we reach a point where the distinctions we make between regions of space no longer corre-
spond to anything in the physical world [4, 5, 6]. Our spatial and substantial distinctions
are warranted by property-indicating events, and these do not license an absolute and
unlimited objectification of spatial or substantial distinctions.
• I believe that there is no classical world. There is only a quantum world.
(Dan Greenberger)
Yes and No! In a world that is not completely differentiated spacewise (nor timewise), the
least fuzzy is only counter factually fuzzy and therefore factually sharp; it conforms to both
quantum mechanics and classical laws. Differently put, in the case of macroscopic objects,
the quantal probability algorithm (represented by a ray in a vector space) degenerates
into the classical probability algorithm (represented by a point in a phase space). Because
this assigns only trivial probabilities (1 or 0), it can be re-interpreted as an evolving state
of affairs. Because quantal probabilities are generally nontrivial, the corresponding re-
interpretation of the quantal algorithm is impossible.
• Quantum mechanics is magic! (Dan Greenberger)
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Absolutely! There is no way of knowing “how Nature does it”—for the simple reason
that the implications of a fundamental theory can never be explained by a “more funda-
mental” theory. (If there were such a theory, the “less fundamental” theory would not be
fundamental at all.) But why should this come as a surprise? Because classical physics
seemed to permit the transmogrification of mathematical symbols into physical processes
or states of affairs? Let’s get real!
• But what about the energy flowing from the source to the detector?
(Thomas Jennewein)
We have a probability algorithm that correlates an event involving the source with an
event involving the detector. This probability algorithm features an action. This action
is “local” (i.e., a spacetime integral over a Lagrange density) in order to ensure (for every
inertial frame) that effects are later than their causes.6 Noether’s theorem guarantees
a conservation law for every continuous symmetry of the Lagrange density, in partic-
ular the conservation of energy-momentum, which is a trivial consequence of a sensible
choice of coordinates (namely, inertial coordinates). Does it follows from this that energy-
momentum is some kind of physical fluid sloshing about in spacetime? Don’t forget that
we are talking exclusively about the mathematical features of a probability algorithm!
• Would Anton agree that electrons are clicks in electron counters? Are fullerenes
clicks in fullerene counters? Is Anton a click in an Anton counter?
(N. David Mermin)
I don’t think a click in an Anton counter would agree that electrons are clicks in electron
counters. But Anton might.7 At any rate, I do. However, conservation laws make a
difference:
Case 1 : A photosource mysteriously loses a certain (more or less fuzzy) energy-
momentum, a photodetector mysteriously gains the same (after a suitable interval de-
pending invariantly on the distance between the two events). Due to our penchant for
confabulation, we speak of the emission, propagation, and absorption of a photon. Be-
cause there is no photon before the so-called emission or after the so-called absorption
(at any rate, not the same photon), the chief merit of this story is that it gives rise to
entertaining puzzles about the propagation of photons.
Case 2 : As long as (or to the extent that) there is a conservation law for electrons,
an electron exists both before and after its detection. However, it only exists because
its existence is indicated by clicks in electron counters, and the properties it has are
precisely those whose possession is indicated by the goings-on in the macroworld. The
same holds for fullerenes, as long as there is an effective conservation law for fullerenes.
Under conditions in which fullerenes break up or otherwise react chemically, the story
gets more complicated, but nothing alters the fact that what happens is what can (in
principle) be inferred from the goings-on in the macroworld.
Case 3 : Apart from energy-momentum, only charges are conserved. In this (fully
relativistic) case, quantum mechanics does not deal with systems of this or that kind,
for the permanent labeling of a system as being of this or that kind requires an effective
6I am talking about controllable effects, not spooky passion at a distance.
7If I am correctly informed, Anton is a likable intelligent conscious living being. I refuse to join in the
pretense that such beings form part of the subject matter of physics.
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conservation law, e.g., a conservation law for Antons, which exists only under conditions
favorable to the survival of Antons.
• Chris Fuchs has taught me to beware of conjoining “objective” to “probability”.
(N. David Mermin)
Chris Fuchs has a way of defining “probability” that makes it inherently subjective. Ac-
cording to Fuchs and Peres8 [13], “probability theory is simply the quantitative formula-
tion of how to make rational decisions in the face of uncertainty.” The quantal correlation
laws do not depend on the existence of rational decision makers. Quantal probabilities
are objective probabilities (not to be confused with relative frequencies) because they
are irreducible ingredients in our fundamental theory of the objective world. They are
macroscopic manifestations of the objective fuzziness that fluffs out matter.
However, in at least one important respect I agree with Chris Fuchs and N. David
Mermin: there are not absolute probabilities. Kolmogorov [14] defines conditional prob-
abilities in terms of absolute, a priori probabilities. As far as quantum mechanics is
concerned, this puts the cart in front of the horse. It bamboozles one into thinking that
wave functions and state vectors (i) define absolute probabilities and (ii) exist in an ante-
rior relationship to propagators (which define conditional probabilities). As emphasized
by Primas [15], quantal probabilities are conditional probabilities.9
Consider, for instance, a stationary state of atomic hydrogen. As every student of
quantum mechanics can confirm, one readily lapses into thinking that this is an objective
state defining absolute probabilities, whereas in reality it is an algorithm that serves to
compute conditional probabilities, e.g., the probability of finding the electron in a certain
region of the imagined space of exact positions relative to the proton, given that the
atom was previously subjected to measurements of three observables: its energy, its total
angular momentum, and one component of its angular momentum.
The misconception that wave functions define absolute probabilities gains support
from a hangover from classical physics, the evolutionary paradigm according to which
physics can be neatly divided into kinematics (concerning the description of a physical
system at any one time) and dynamics (concerning the evolution of a physical system
from earlier to later times). A world that is not completely differentiated spacewise is
also not completely differentiated timewise [4, 5]. And in a world that is not completely
differentiated timewise, evolution is ill-defined. To the question of how many modes of
evolution there are, the correct answer is neither two (unitary and state reduction) nor
one (only unitary) but none.
The evolutionary paradigm conceals a most important aspect of the quantal correlation
laws: their time-symmetry. They allow us not only to assign prior probabilities (on the
basis of earlier measurement outcomes) but also posterior probabilities (on the basis of
later outcomes) and even probabilities that depend on both earlier and later outcomes.
The latter are calculated according to the ABL rule [18, 19] rather than the standard
8De mortuis nil nisi bene: With statements like the following, Asher Peres has earned my deep and
abiding respect: “. . . there is no interpolating wave function giving the ‘state of the system’ between
measurements.” [12]
9A more natural formulation of probability theory from the quantal point of view is therefore that
due to Re´nyi [16], which is based on conditional probabilities. Re´nyi [17] has shown that every result of
Kolmogorov’s probability theory can be translated into a theory based entirely on conditional probabilities.
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Born rule, and they can be encapsulated in a “two-state” [20] in place of a wave function.
After a spin-0 particle has decayed into two spin-1
2
particles, the spins of the latter are
“entangled” (meaning that outcomes of spin measurements with respect to the same axis
are anticorrelated)—and so are the spins of two particles that are yet to fuse into a spin-0
particle!
• After all, we understand very little about our universe! (Christophe Salomon)
How true!
• If we want to look beyond, we have to find a completely new way to look at nature.
(Jo¨rg Schmiedmayer)
Perhaps the way of looking I’ve been trying to communicate for some time? ⊙
⊙
⇀)
• Reversibility is just a question of money. (Vlatko Vedral)
Negative. Reversibility requires determinism, which requires a world that is completely
differentiated both spacewise and timewise (that is, a world unlike ours).
• Physics will in the future put less emphasis on equations and mathematics but more
on verbal understanding. (A. Z. as quoted by Peter Zoller)
Obviously. Mathematical equations do not address the problem of making physical sense
of mathematical equations.
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